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Among the significant considerations to which parties intending to effect a
business combination must give attention is the impact of the transaction on
labor-management relationships.' In a merger, consolidation, or purchase-
of-assets, thought must be given to the extent to which obligations created by
an extant collective bargaining agreement will survive to bind the owner of
the resulting company. The corporate parties to these combinations will
naturally be concerned with certain specific questions in this area.
Will the subsequent employer be deemed a "successor?" 2  If he is a suc-
cessor, must he then comply with all of the terms of the labor agreement?
Particularly in a merger, what will be the consequences of integrating the
predecessor's unionized employees into the purchaser's own nonunionized
unit or unit represented by a different union? The proper determination and
resolution of these and related questions is clearly important in ensuring the
continued functioning of the acquired enterprise.
Acquiring employers and union representatives have often disagreed as to
their contractual duties and rights. These disputes have produced a limited,
but significant, number of decisions pertaining to business combinations.
Most developments have been recent for it was not until March 30, 1964 that
* This article is dedicated to the author's parents and to the memory of the late
Professor Carlos Israels of the Columbia University Law School.
** Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Office of General Counsel; B.A.,
Haverford College, 1965; LL.B., Columbia University, 1968; Member of the Pennsyl-
vania Bar. The views expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of
the National Labor Relations Board or of the General Counsel.
1. See Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Acquistions,
70 HxAv. L. REV. 1183, 1200 (1957).
2. The term "successor" or "successor employer" refers to a subsequent employer
who is adjudged to be required to recognize obligations to and rights of the acquired
company's employees under their prior collective bargaining agreement.
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the Supreme Court in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston clarified several of
the basic problems in this area. That decision also gave rise to several sig-
nificant questions which subsequent cases have not yet entirely answered.
There have, however, been various expansions of the Wiley principle which
are relatively explicit, and there are, consequently, increasing indications of
the labor responsibilities of the successor employers who emerge from busi-
ness combinations.
The Wiley decision held that a successor employer may be obligated under
his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate grievances of
the predecessor's employees which have arisen as a result of a merger or,
impliedly, other business combination, provided "the business entity remains
the same" or there is a "continuity of identity."4 It had a substantial effect
on labor-management relationships in the business combination field, and for
an understanding of both its significance and its evolution, a review of the
rules and decisions predating Wiley is necessary.
Pre-Wiley Law
Prior to 1960, common law contract principles dominated judicial thinking in
this area, and predecessors' collective bargaining agreements, treated as or-
dinary contracts, generally were held not to bind nonsigning successors to
their terms.5 In purchase-of-assets situations, for example, contract rules
precluded the binding of unconsenting successors to their sellers' general con-
tractual obligations.6 Consequently, numerous courts held that purchasers,
not having been parties to their sellers' collective bargaining agreements, were
not obligated to adhere to them7 except in unusual circumstances.
8 Most
3. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
4. Id. at 549, 551.
5. See Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Col-
lective Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C.L. REv. 413, 415 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Patrick].
6. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
7. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 227 F. Supp. 843,
845 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Machinists Local 954 v.
Shawnee Indus., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 347, 351 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Office Employes Local
153 v. Ward-Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 328 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959); Tarr v. Association of St. Elec. Ry. Employees, 73 Idaho 223, 227-29, 250 P.2d
904, 906 (1952).
8. Collective bargaining agreements had been held to be continuing obligations
where the transaction was only intended to avail the seller of a means to avoid his
obligations; the successor was merely the alter ego of the predecessor, as when the
operation and organization of the acquired company were maintained in virtually the
same form as before, and the buyer expressly or impliedly assumed the predecessor's
obligations. See Note, The Contractual Obligations of a Successor Employer Under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement of a Predecessor, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 914, 917
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Successor Contractual Obligations].
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courts even declined to enforce clauses in collective bargaining agreements
which sought expressly to bind purchasers to the contractual terms.9
Labor unions faced problems in mergers also. Although under general
corporation principles "in the case of a merger the corporation which sur-
vives is liable for the debts and contracts of the one which disappears,"' 10 no
court apparently had had occasion to rule that a union could enforce a
predecessor's labor agreement following a merger."
In 1947, however, the Taft-Hartley Act was passed as an amendment to
the Labor-Management Relations Act.i2 Section 301(a) of the Act provides
a judicial forum for suits involving "violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce . . ."13 Interpreting that section, the Supreme Court
stated in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills' 4 that "the substantive law
to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."' 5 Thereafter the federal
courts began "to fashion a federal common law of industrial relations from
the policies of the national labor laws."' 6 The culmination of this develop-
ment came in the Steelworkers Trilogy'7 which laid the foundation for the
Wiley decision. In the Trilogy the Supreme Court viewed the collective bar-
gaining agreement in a new light. It considered the agreement "more than
a contract; it [was] a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate . . . . [It covered] the whole employ-
ment relationship. It [called] into being a new common law-the common
law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.' 8  The collective bar-
gaining agreement was to provide the framework of rules by which labor-
management relationships would be governed.
In conjunction with this new view of labor agreements in the context of
9. See Patrick, supra note 5, at 416.
10. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 n.3 (1964), citing
15 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7121 (rev. ed. 1961).
11. Most post-merger suits were instituted by ordinary creditors seeking to enforce
prior obligations. See Successor Contractual Obligations, supra note 8, at 918. The
absence of any prior labor decision on this issue is indicated by the Wiley Court's
inability to cite any precedent for its holding, although the decision has been said
to be a natural extension of the general merger-corporation rule cited in Wiley, id.
at 915.
12. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
14. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
15. Id. at 456.
16. Patrick, supra note 5, at 417.
17. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
18. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960).
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federal labor law, the Supreme Court cited the role of arbitration in promoting
national labor policies. Lincoln Mills had initially recognized that enforce-
ment of general arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements for
processing of employee grievances was the most effective means of achieving
industrial peace. The Trilogy further emphasized the point: "Arbitration is
the means of solving the unforseeable by molding a system of private law for
all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way
which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the par-
ties."'19 Thus arose a "federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitra-
tion"20 which had, by 1960, become so pervasive that courts would compel
arbitration, under a general arbitration clause, of problems relating to all
terms and provisions of a labor agreement except those expressly excluded
from consideration in the arbitration clause. 21
In view of these developments, labor unions began seeking to compel suc-
cessors to at least arbitrate grievances arising under their prior contracts.
Various lower federal courts, however, denied their claims, relying on the
successor's absence as a party to the agreement which contained the arbitra-
tion clause. 22 "Prior to Wiley, no court had accepted the argument that the
legal hiatus between a prior employer's express agreement to arbitrate and a
subsequent employer's failure to adopt the agreement could be spanned by
federal labor policy."'23 Wiley changed this.
Wiley
Wiley involved the 1962 merger of Interscience Publishers, Inc. and John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., both large publishing firms, with the consequential dis-
continuance of the former as a separately operating entity. On the date of
the merger, a collective bargaining agreement with a remaining term of four
months was in effect between Interscience and District 65, Retail, Wholesale
and Department Store Workers, the union representing 40 of its 80 em-
ployees. Although the Wiley employees were not organized, all but a few of
Interscience's unionized workers were retained by and continued in the em-
ploy of Wiley.
Discussions between the union and both Interscience and Wiley before and
after the consummation of the merger brought no agreement on the effect of
19. Id. at 581.
20. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960).
21. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
22. See, e.g., Livingston v. Gindoff Textile Corp., 191 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Office Employes Local 153 v. Ward-Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
23. Patrick, supra note 5, at 420.
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the transaction on the labor contract or on the survival under it of the bene-
fits of the union workers hired by Wiley. The union argued that Wiley, as
successor to Interscience, was obligated to observe certain employee rights
(specifically those in regard to seniority, employer pension fund payments,
job security and grievance procedures, vacation benefits, and severance pay)
which had vested under the Interscience contract. At the very least, the
union believed, Wiley should be required to arbitrate these matters under the
contract's general arbitration clause. 24 The company, however, maintained
that the merger had terminated the agreement for all purposes, and that
never having been a party to that agreement, it could not be bound by its
terms. Out-of-court solution appearing hopeless, the union filed suit under
Section 301 to compel the company to submit to arbitration.
The narrow but significant issue with which the Supreme Court was faced
was "whether Wiley, which did not itself sign the collective bargaining agree-
ment on which the Union's claim to arbitration depends, is bound at all by
the agreement's arbitration provision. ' 25  Speaking for the Court, Justice
Harlan stated:
We hold that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer
which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a
union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees
covered by the agreement, and that, in appropriate circumstances,
present here, the successor employer may be required to arbitrate
with the union under the agreement.
26
Wiley, then, was required to arbitrate the extent to which it was bound by the
terms of the Interscience collective agreement with regard to the former
Interscience employees whom it had hired.
The Court focused on the role of arbitration in fostering industrial peace
recognized in the Trilogy. Recalling those cases, the Court continued:
It would derogate from "the federal policy of settling labor disputes
by arbitration" . . . if a change in the corporate structure or owner-
ship of a business enterprise had the automatic consequence of
removing a duty to arbitrate previously established; this is so as
much in cases like the present, where the contracting employer
disappears into another by merger, as in those in which one owner
replaces another but the business entity remains the same.
27
24. The Interscience agreement's broad arbitration clause covered "any differences,
grievance or dispute between the Employer and the Union arising out of or relating
to this agreement, or its interpretation or application, or enforcement . . . ." John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 553 (1964).
25. Id. at 547. Since Wiley is the fourtainhead of law in the field, and since
subsequent decisions rely heavily on it and its policy, it is appropriate to reproduce
pertinent sections at length.
26. Id. at 548.
27. Id. at 549.
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Pointing to the respective interests of the conflicting parties and reiterating its
faith in the arbitral process, the Court went on to discuss the value and role
of the collective bargaining agreement in labor-management relations:
Central to the peculiar status and function of a collective bargain-
ing agreement is the fact, dictated both by circumstances . . . and
by the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act, that it
is not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual rela-
tionship. Therefore, although the duty to arbitrate . . . must be
founded on a contract, the impressive policy considerations favor-
ing arbitration are not wholly overborne by the fact that Wiley
did not sign the contract being construed . . . . There was a con-
tract, and Interscience, Wiley's predecessor, was party to it. We
thus find Wiley's obligation to arbitrate this dispute in the Inter-
science contract construed in the context of a national labor pol-
icy. 28
Thus, a federal policy of peaceful settlement of labor disputes compelled
Wiley to arbitrate employee grievances based on its predecessor's contract.
Arbitration was not, however, to be required after every business combina-
tion,
there may be cases in which the lack of any substantial continuity
of identity in the business enterprise before and after a change
would make a duty to arbitrate something imposed from without,
not reasonably to be found in the particular bargaining agreement
and the acts of the parties involved. So too, we do not rule out
the possibility that a union might abandon its right to arbitration
by failing to make its claim known.29
Where "substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise" exists, 0
however, and the particular employee claims would have been arbitrable
under the contract prior to the merger, the successor will be compelled to
submit such claims to arbitration.8'
Subsequent Cases
32
Narrowly and carefully drawn, Justice Harlan's opinion in Wiley left several
significant problems unresolved. Although subsequent judicial and NLRB
28. Id. at 550-51.
29. Id. at 551.
30. The Court found "relevant similarity and continuity of operation across the
change in ownership" were present in Wiley, id.
31. See discussion accompanying notes 43-56, infra.
32. It is appropriate at this point to explain that a union may also seek recourse
against a successor who is unwilling to abide by the terms of its predecessor's labor
agreement, other than by instituting suit under Section 301, by filing a Section 8(a)(5)
refusal-to-bargain charge with the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter NLRB].
If a successor is found to exist it will be required to bargain with the union over any
changes it wishes to make in the terms of the predecessor's contract. Various questions
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decisions have not provided complete answers to these questions, there have
been important developments in several areas.
Other Business Combinations
One of the first problems considered subsequent to Wiley was whether its
rationale extended beyond mergers. Upon analysis it becomes clear that
it does apply to stock acquisitions.33 The purchase-of-assets situation, how-
ever, has presented a little more difficulty. Prior to Wiley buyers were not
generally obligated by their predecessors' labor contracts. 34 Wiley impliedly
changed this, since the Court, after decrying the harm which would result
from an abrogation of an arbitration requirement merely because of a change
in corporate ownership, stated: "[T]his is so as much in cases like the pres-
ent, where the contracting employer disappears into another by merger, as in
those in which one owner replaces another but the business entity remains
the same."
'35
In addition, several courts of appeals have considered this question di-
rectly and have applied the Wiley principle to asset purchases. In Wacken-
hut Corp. v. Local 151, Plant Guard Workers,36 Wackenhut had bought
all the assets of General Plant Protection Co., expressly assuming all liabilities
of General Plant except its contract with the union. The unionized em-
ployees of General Plant continued, however, to work for Wackenhut, and
the corporation retained rights and benefits comparable to those under the
General Plant contract in all respects but those concerning wage increases,
dues checkoff, and union shop requirements. The union sought to compel
arbitration of these matters under its General Plant contract. Easily finding
the requisite continuity of identity in the business, the court believed that,
based upon the policy of the national labor laws,
[w]hat the Supreme Court did [in Wiley] was to balance the
are presented to a union in making the decision of whether to approach the courts:
the different jurisdictional standards for approaching the respective bodies; the passing
of the six-month statute of limitations of the National Labor Relations Act (as
amended National Labor Relations Act Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. Section 160(b)
(1964)); the loss of the union's status as the legitimate representative of the prede-
cessor's employees before or after the business combination is effected, thus possibly
precluding its bargaining with the successor (see, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968)); and
the different remedies available in the respective forums. Inherent in the availability
of two forums are the different approaches and rationales which have arisen and been
expressed by the judiciary and by the NLRB in resolving successorship cases. Although
not totally disparate in their reasoning, each forum has developed a distinct body of
law in considering several of the questions relating to Wiley's progeny.
33. See Shaw & Carter, Sales, Mergers and Union Contract Relations, 19 N.Y.U.
CONF. LABOR 357, 358 (1967).
34. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
35. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
36. 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
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rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their
businesses . . .against the necessity of affording some protection
to the employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement
containing an arbitration clause, from a sudden change in the em-
ployment relationship. 7
It then held the Wiley doctrine applicable to the situation before it, and re-
quired Wackenhut to arbitrate the union claims.
In United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc.,88 the Third Circuit
considered a similar situation in which an FTC order requiring divestiture by
Martin Marietta Corp. of its Bridgeville, Ohio plant resulted in the sale of
the plant to Reliance Universal, Inc. Pointing to Wiley's assertion of the
significance of labor arbitration, the court stated:
Wiley was a merger case. In the present case the plant was sold
as a going concern . . . . [T]he legal and equitable considerations
involved in imposing a predecessor's obligations upon an independ-
ent successor are no different in a merger case than in a sale of
business case. We have no doubt that the result the court reached
in the Wiley case would have been the same had the transfer there
been accomplished by a sale of the business instead of by mer-
ger.89
It has been argued that the Supreme Court had not meant to have, and
that the respective circuit courts should not have so applied the Wiley rule. 40
The Fifth Circuit has pointed out, however, that the application of the Wiley
principle to purchases-of-assets is fairly well settled,41 and even the critics of
Reliance and Wackenhut will agree that it is.42
Criteria of Successorship
Despite their distinct approaches to the problems of successorship, both the
courts and the NLRB have developed fairly similar criteria in determining
whether it exists. It is a settled rule that it is for courts, rather than for ar-
bitrators, to determine "substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise before and after a change" so as to establish a subsequent em-
ployer as a "successor," bound to arbitrate grievances under his predecessor's
labor agreement. 48 But what standards may a court employ in making that
determination? The Wiley Court found the requisite "similarity and con-
tinuity of operation" in the situation before it "adequately evidenced by the
37. Id. at 958.
38. 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
39. Id. at 894.
40. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38, 42-43 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); Shaw & Carter, supra note 33, at 366-69.
41. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38, 44 (5th Cir. 1967).
42. See, e.g., Shaw & Carter, supra note 33, at 369.
43. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964).
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wholesale transfer of Interscience employees to the Wiley plant, apparently
without difficulty. '44  "Clearly, however, this is not the only factor to be
considered . . . for, if that were the case, Wiley could be easily avoided by
the successor corporation's refusal to hire the predecessor's employees. '45
Although Reliance and Wackenhut employed virtually the same employee-
hiring criterion as Wiley, other cases have gone beyond this. Brotherhood
of Pulp Mill Workers v. Great Northwest Fibre Co.,46 for example, pointed
out in designating a successor that
[t]he product manufactured by the defendant [successor] is so sim-
ilar as to be considered. . . the same as the product manufactured
by Pacific Pulp [the predecessor]. The plant is the same plant
operated by the predecessor. The method of operation is similar
to that of Pacific Pulp .... 47
Hotel Employees Union v. Joden, Inc.,4s added these factors: that there
was no delay for alteration of the premises or in operation after the business
changed hands, that the nature of the enterprise involved remained the same
as before the change of ownership, and that the business appealed to the
same clientele as it had previously. 49 And, in Monroe Sander Corp. v.
Livingston,50 where a union was seeking to compel arbitration to recover
jobs which the employees of a recently closed subsidiary were denied at a
newly purchased subsidiary, it was found significant that both plants were
located in the same geographical area and that the jobs in each were quite
similar.5 '
There are particular situations in which the courts could preclude arbitra-
tion without considering the applicability of these factors, for example, a
44. Id. at 551.
45. Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 262 F. Supp. 129, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
modified, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967). See also K.B. &
J. Young's Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463, 465-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 841 (1967); Note, Obligations of Successor Employers: Recent Variations on
the John Wiley Theme, 2 GA. L. REV. 574, 585-86 (1968).
46. 263 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Wash. 1965).
47. Id. at 169.
48. 262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1966).
49. Id. at 396.
50. 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
51. Id. at 12. A general guide for the courts has been suggested in a recent article:
[Tihere must be a judicial finding that the transfer of ownership has not so
radically altered the employment setting as to render the prior collective
bargaining agreement wholly unsuitable to continue to regulate the employee's
rights and obligations . . . . [The similarities between the predecessor's
and successor's businesses should] indicate that the old contract may have
sufficient relevance to the successor enterprise to justify arbitration thereunder.
Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate: A Reconsideration of John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARv. L. REV. 418, 427, 431 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Successor Employers].
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massive voluntary reorganization necessary for the survival of an enterprise. 52
Apart from this and similar special situations, however, the courts will gen-
erally analyze the circumstances before them and determine whether a new
owner is a successor in accordance with the standards set forth above.
In addition to those criteria established by the judiciary, the NLRB has,
over several years, created a number of successorship criteria for refusal-to-
bargain charges following changes in ownership, which it believed the Su-
preme Court had in mind deciding Wiley. 53 Thus, the Board considers:
(1) whether there has been a substantial continuity of the same
business operations; (2) whether the new employer uses the same
plant; (3) whether he has the same or substantially the same work
force; (4) whether the same jobs exist under the same working
conditions; (5) whether he employs the same supervisors; (6)
whether he uses the same machinery, equipment, and methods of
production; and (7) whether he manufactures the same product
or offers the same services.
54
The criteria established by the respective forums to determine successor
status are, then, fairly similar.5 5 The cases imply that the rehiring of a sub-
stantial number of the predecessor's employees55 and the similarity of the
new business to the old are the major factors considered.
Extent of Terms Carried Over
Another important issue largely left unanswered by the Supreme Court is
the extent to which a predecessor's agreement survives to bind a successor.
Does the entire contract automatically continue in effect, subject only to an
arbitrator's interpretation of the terms, or may he decline to apply some of
its provisions to a new owner? Justice Harlan touched upon this problem in
52. See Successor Contractual Obligations, supra note 8, at 933-34; Patrick, supra
note 5, at 426-27.
53. See Fanning, The Purchaser and the Labor Contract-An Escalating Theory,
1967 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 284 [hereinafter cited as Fanning].
54. Id. at 286. For a discussion of the recent developments concerning the
specifics of several of these criteria, see Gordon, Legal Questions of Successorship,
3 GA. L. REv. 280, 283-91 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gordon].
55. But see Brief of NLRB General Counsel at 14, Kota Div. of Dura Corp., Case
No. 18-CA-2419 (NLRB, filed Feb. 16, 1968) [hereinafter cited as General Counsel's
Brief], suggesting that Wiley would not have constituted a "continuing 'employing in-
dustry'" under Board criteria, since Wiley was considerably larger than Interscience had
been. Contra, Willard, Labor Law Aspects of Corporate Acquisitions, 36 U. Mo. K.C.L.
REV. 241, 243-44 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Willard].
56. The Board currently holds that "a majority of the purchaser's employee
complement must consist of the predecessor's unit employees in order to support a
bargaining obligation by the purchaser on a successorship theory; otherwise such a
bargaining obligation will be found only if the union has actual majority status among
the purchaser's employees." Gordon, supra note 54, at 290. See also Goldberg,
The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 735, 793,
804 (1969); Willard, supra note 55, at 242; Successor Employers, supra note 51, at
430-31.
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replying to the contention that the Interscience agreement could not cover
post-merger claims: "It would be inconsistent with our holding that the
obligation to arbitrate survived the merger were we to hold that the fact of
the merger, without more, removed claims otherwise plainly arbitrable from
the scope of the arbitration clause."'57 But he did not further expound his
views.
Wackenhut was one of the first cases to consider this question, and its deci-
sion has been a center of controversy ever since. The court there stated:
The specific rule which we derive from Wiley is that where there
is substantial similarity of operation and continuity of identity of
the business enterprise before and after a change in ownership,
a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration provi-
sion, entered into by the predecessor employer is binding upon the
successor employer . . . . It follows that under the rule of Wiley,
Wackenhut is bound by the collective bargaining agreement en-
tered into by General Plant, and is bound thereunder to arbitrate
the union grievances . . . . (emphasis added) .5
This has been interpreted by the Third Circuit in Reliance (although it re-
jected the concept) as stating that a labor contract is automatically and un-
qualifiedly binding on a successor,5 9 limited only by an arbitrator's interpre-
tation of its specific terms and application of them to particular circumstances
and events. 60
It is possible, however, that the Ninth Circuit did not really mean to extend
Wiley so far. The actual issue before it was limited to whether the pur-
chaser was bound by the prior arbitration clause, and the result of the de-
cision was only to require the company to arbitrate grievances under the
provision. In any event, the Wackenhut concept has not been accepted
elsewhere.
The Reliance court was confronted with the argument that the union's
contract with Martin Marietta Corp. was "unqualifiedly binding on Reliance,
as would have been the case if there had been an assignment or novation
substituting Reliance as a party to the instrument."' 61  Although taking
note of the Ninth Circuit's concept, it declined to read Wiley so broadly and
stated its own view:
57. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 554 (1964).
58. Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir.
1964).
59. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 n.3 (3d Cir.
1964).
60. See Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Col-
lective Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C.L. REv. 413, 429 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Patrick].
61. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir.
1964).
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[Wiley] merely reasoned and decided that federal labor law im-
posed upon a succeeding proprietor a duty to arbitrate those ques-
tions which his predecessor was bound to arbitrate under his labor
contract . . . .In any event, we find implicit in the guarded lan-
guage of the Wiley opinion, recognition and concern that new cir-
cumstances created by the acquisition of a business by a new owner
may make it unreasonable or inequitable to require labor or man-
agement to adhere to particular terms of a collective bargaining
agreement previously negotiated by a different party in different
circumstances . . . .[An arbitrator . . .may properly consider
any relevant new circumstances arising out of the change of own-
ership, as well as the provisions of and practices under the old
contract, in achieving a just and equitable settlement of the griev-
ance at hand. The requirements of the contract remain basic
guides to the law of the shop, but the arbitrator may find that
equities inherent in changed circumstances require an award in a
particular controversy at variance with some term or terms of that
contract.62
Thus, although guided by the contractual terms, the arbitrator was to possess
the power to preclude inequities which might arise from a literal application
of the terms to a successor.63
A late 1966 district court case, Retail Stores Employees Local 954 v.
Lane's of Findlay, Inc.64 also considered the problem. In that situation, a
contract between the union and Gallaher Drug Company, owner of a large
retail drug chain, was extant when Lane's bought from the company certain
of its Findlay, Ohio store's equipment and supplies, assumed its lease, but
took no other of its assets or liabilities. Lane's then closed the store, made
certain changes in its operations, and subsequently re-opened with all new
employees. Thereafter, the union, unable to obtain enforcement of the prior
contract, brought suit against Lane's for specific enforcement.
The district court maintained, however, that Wiley did not command en-
forcement and had only decided that the successor's duty to arbitrate sur-
vived a transfer. Noting Justice Harlan's reliance on a national labor policy
which recognized arbitration as a "substitute for tests of strength between
62. Id.
63. Nearly 95 percent of all collective bargaining agreements contain arbitration
clauses. Although about 60 percent of these place some explicit restriction on the
arbitrator's power or on the scope of arbitration itself, most terms and problems are not
eliminated from consideration (only arbitration of wages is excluded by as many
as 20 percent of all arbitration provisions). Furthermore, a significant number of
labor contracts with general arbitration clauses are similar to that in the Interscience
contract (noted above at note 24), which, not excluding any specific provisions from
arbitral consideration, necessarily encompass all the terms of and problems arising
under their respective contracts. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS
IN UNION CONTRACTS 51:7-9 (5th ed. 1961).
64, Z60 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
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contending forces, occupying a central role in resolving disputes and avoiding
industrial strife,"65 the court rejected the union's pleas. To grant specific en-
forcement, it believed, would be to usurp the function of the arbitrator to
whom the Wiley Court had specifically delegated the responsibility of deter-
mining the merits of each situation and of applying the terms of the surviving
contract. It was, therefore, not for a court to pass on the merits itself by
broadly granting specific enforcement:
[I]t ill-behooves a court to read into a Supreme Court decision
limitations which are not there . . . . [T]he fact that the Supreme
Court was presented with the opportunity to invest the courts
[solely] with the duty to resolve the successorship issue, but de-
clined to do so, cannot be ignored. For this reason. . . the union's
demand for specific enforcement of the entire collective bargaining
agreement must be denied.
66
It has been argued that it is anomalous to hold, as Reliance did, that an
arbitration clause survives a transfer but that the other contractual terms are
not necessarily carried over. 7 It is also contended that the delegation of a
broad power to an arbitrator to decide the applicability of various parts of a
contract will, in effect, constitute a power to rewrite the agreement for the
parties. Furthermore, it is maintained that an arbitral award based on
principles of equity, as Reliance advocated, may be at variance with a spe-
cific contractual provision and therefore unenforceable. But the mere pos-
sibility of an unenforceable arbitral decision seems to be a poor rationale for
misreading the words of the Supreme Court. Wiley had stated "[W]e have
little doubt that within the flexible procedures of arbitration a solution can be
reached which would avoid disturbing labor relations in the Wiley plant."6s
In view of this delegation and of the Court's express disinclination to bind
the company by itself determining the merits of the arbitrable issues, the
arguments advocating the automatic survival of a predecessor's entire agree-
ment in a Section 301 suit under current court case law are sufficiently re-
butted.
Although the NLRB arguably "should be given primary responsibility for
determining generally the issue of contract survival, as a means of avoiding
lack of uniformity or unpredictability," 69 it has so far carefully avoided im-
posing contractual terms on successors, despite several opportunities to make
65. Id. at 657, citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
66. Retail Store Employees, Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp.
655, 658 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
67. See, e.g., Shaw & Carter, supra note 33, at 369-72; Successor Employers, supra
note 51, at 422.
68. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 552 n.5 (1964).
69. Successor Employers, supra note 51, at 428 n.28.
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a definite ruling and despite the arguments of its own General Counsel.70
It has limited its decisions to rulings that particular employers were succes-
sors and were, therefore, obligated to bargain in good faith 7' with their prede-
cessors' unions with regard to any changes intended or made in the terms of
the labor contracts covering the predecessors' employees.
72
The moment of decision for the Board on this question of contract survival
has apparently arrived, however, for it is currently considering five cases
73
which squarely present the issue.74 In Chemical Workers Union v. NLRB 75
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reviewing the
Board's order in Hackney Iron & Steel Co.,76 remanded the case to the
Board specifically for "further consideration of the question of whether the
employer should be called upon to observe the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement in effect at the time of the acquisition. '7 7  The General
Counsel is pursuing his previous contention that predecessors' labor contracts
carryover, in entirety, to bind successors in the other cases as well. 78
70. The General Counsel announced in 1965 that he had authorized issuance of
several refusal to bargain complaints under Section 8(a)(5) "not only on the basis
that the employer involved succeeded to the bargaining obligation of the predecessor
company, but also on the ground that under Wiley and related court cases, such 'suc-
cessor' was bound to honor those terms ...which were not 'unreasonable or inequit-
able' under the circumstances." Gordon, supra note 54, at 308. The cases arising pur-
suant to this policy are listed in the General Counsel's Brief, supra note 55, at 10.
71. See discussion of successors' duty to bargain, p. 16 infra.
72. See Gordon, supra note 54, at 316-18, for an explanation of the Board's
reluctance to impose a predecessor's contract on a successor and of the difficulties
involved in establishing such a rule. But the suggestion has been made that the
"practical distinction ...between such a ruling and the present pos'tion of the Board
may be difficult to find ... [since,] [wihen a duty to bargain exists, and the union
has sought bargaining, the employer is not free to make unilateral changes in wages,
hours and other conditions of employment without bargaining with the union."
Willard, supra note 55, at 246. This view, however, is not entirely. accurate. If a
contract does not carry over to bind a successor, he may fulfill his statutory duty by
bargaining in good faith to impasse, after which he may unilaterally implement changes
he had proposed to the union during negotiations. If the contract does carry over,
however, bargaining to agreement with the union will be necessary under Section 8(d)
of the Act before changes can be made.
73. Kota Div. of Dura Corp., Case No. 18-CA-2419 (NLRB, filed Feb. 16, 1968);
Travelodge Corp., Case No. 21-CA-7694 (NLRB, filed April 22, 1968); Hackney
Iron & Steel Co., Case Nos. 23-CA-2505 and 23-CA-2554 (NLRB, filed May 1, 1968);
William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., Case No. 31-CA-776 (NLRB, filed June
4, 1968). These cases have been consolidated and oral hearing before the Board, an
unusual event, was held on April 23, 1969.
74. Kota Div. of Dura Corp., Case No. 18-CA-2419 (NLRB, filed Feb. 16, 1968),
however, involves the extent to which a union is required to observe the contract it
signed with a predecessor employer, once a successor has assumed the business.
75. 395 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
76. 167 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1967).
77. Chemical Workers Union v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 639, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
78. In brief summary, the General Counsel is arguing:
Reason and logic would appear to dictate the continued applicability of other
clauses of the agreement [i.e., clauses other than an arbitration provision] in
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It is possible that the Board may attempt again to avoid a disposition of this
difficult problem. It is more probable, however, that it will have to make
some sort of definitive ruling and choose from among several alternative
solutions.79 In the opinion of this writer the Board will go beyond Wiley and
hold, like the Third Circuit in Reliance, that where a subsequent employer is
deemed a successor, additional contract terms will continue in effect between
the successor and the union. The national labor policies on which the Wiley
decision was predicated are significant,8 0 and it is anticipated that the Board's
decision will be based on these policy considerations. Specifically, the proba-
bility of ensuring industrial peace through continued imposition of contractual
obligations on both management and labor and the need to protect em-
ployees from diminution of their rights by a business transaction in which
they had no voice, after having been assured of these rights by the contract
negotiated with their predecessor employer, warrant such a holding.
Successor employers will not be unduly burdened by such a ruling. Many
problems may be avoided by their inviting union representatives into sale or
merger negotiations to discuss the labor relations aspects of the impending
business combination. Other difficulties arising after consummation of the
transaction may be susceptible to arbitration, assuming, as is likely,8' that
the predecessor's contract has an arbitration clause.
We must await the Kota decision and those in the probable suits for en-
forcement of the Board's orders before there can be greater certainty in this
the absence of special circumstances arising from the transfer of ownership
making it unreasonable or inequitable to exact performance of certain clauses.
For it would be illogical and inconsistent with the basic considerations under-
lying the policies of our national labor laws upon which Wiley is bottomed
to hold that the arbitration clause continues and the other clauses of the
contract do not.
The need to protect employees from the impact of sudden changes in
ownership in which they had no voice stressed in Wiley extends to all the
provisions of the agreement. The objective of industrial peace is promoted
by full contractual stability. The unique attributes of a collective bargaining
contract as an instrument of government speak against a hiatus resulting from
a termination of the contract upon takeover by a successor. The thrust of
Wiley . . . extends beyond arbitration. In sum, Wiley updates the [NLRB's]
"employing industry" concept by applying it to contract continuity. It seems
a short but reasonable and logical step wholly consistent with the Act's
policies for the Board, in recognition of Wiley's scope, to incorporate contract
continuity as an administrative corollary of the "employing industry" concept
in enforcing the statutory command to bargain collectively.
General Counsel's Brief, supra note 55, at 12-13.
79. For a discussion of the alternative solutions from which the General Counsel
has proposed that the NLRB choose see Gordon, supra note 54, at 312-14.
80. It must be remembered that although the holding in Wiley appeared to be
very limited, this was a result of the narrow issue posed by Interscience's union which,
after completion of the merger in question, constituted only a minority representative of
the enlarged employee unit.
81. See discussion, supra note 63.
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area. The final disposition of this issue may have to be made by the Supreme
Court. If the Board holds as is suggested above, however, it does not seem
unreasonable to predict that that Court, in view of the national labor policies
it recognized in Wiley, will affirm the Board's decision.
Successors' Duty to Bargain
The issue of a successor's duty to bargain was not undertaken by the Supreme
Court in Wiley. There, Justice Harlan stated:
[W]e do not suggest any view on the questions surrounding a cer-
tified union's claim to continued representative status following a
change in ownership . . . .This Union does not assert that it has
any bargaining rights independent of the Interscience agreement;
it seeks to arbitrate claims based on that agreement . . . not to
negotiate a new agreement. s2
The Board has restricted its rulings in the business combination field to ob-
ligating successors to bargain in good faith with their predecessors' unions over
changes in the terms and conditions of employment of the predecessors'
workers.88
Where a simple purchase-of-assets is involved, there is little doubt of the
buyer's responsibility. The rule, as clearly stated in Overnite Transportation
Co. v. NLRB,84 is settled that "if the transfer of assets and employees from
one employer to another leaves intact the identity of the employing enter-
prise, then the former's duty to recognize and bargain with an incumbent
union devolves upon the latter as 'successor employer.' "85 If such an em-
ployer refuses to deal with the union, the latter may file a Section 8(a)(5)
refusal-to-bargain charge 6 with the NLRB. Upon determining the pur-
chaser to be a successor under the criteria discussed previously, the NLRB
will require him to bargain with the union and refrain from instituting changes
with respect to wages and working conditions without first engaging in such
bargaining.
Where a commingling of separate groups of employees is effected, how-
ever, the problem is greater. A subsequent employer may rightfully decline
to bargain with an incumbent union where his own employees are not organ-
ized if he has a good faith doubt of the continued majority status of the
union. 7 Where his own employees are represented by another union, more-
82. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964).
83. See text accompanying note 72, supra.
84. 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967). See also Chem-
rock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965).
85. Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1967).
86. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
87. See Platt, The NLRB and the Arbitrator in Sale and Merger Situations, 19
N.Y.U. CoNsF. LABOR 375, 388-89 (1967); Gordon, supra note 54, at 291.
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over, he may not violate his duty of neutrality by dealing with either organi-
zation, unless, of course, he believes that one, generally of his own em-
ployees, is clearly a majority representative.
Clarification of such situations, however, is possible. The employer him-
self may petition under Section 9(c) of the Labor Act88 for a Board hearing
and, if a representation question is determined to exist, for an election to
determine his bargaining opponent. More often, however, the initiative will
be taken by the union. It may attempt to compel the employer immediately
to deal with it on threat of a Section 8(a)(5) charge. As indicated pre-
viously, this is the usual way by which Wiley situations reach the Board. 9
An alternative for the union is filing a representation petition under Section
9(c) calling upon the Board to find at its hearing that the employer is obli-
gated to deal with it and perhaps determine that its contract constitutes a bar
to a representation claim and petition for election by any competing union.
Again, if the Board determines that the business changes have created a
representation question, particularly where there are competing unions, it may
then direct an election to be held among the employees in order to ascertain
their exclusive bargaining representative.
Arbitrators' Criteria
The Wiley Court, in its final determination, signified its faith in the peace-
making ability of arbitration by leaving the resolution of specific issues and
grievances to the discretion of the arbitrator.9 0 The question arises, however,
as to what criteria an arbitrator should or may apply in deciding the issues in
controversy remanded to him for resolution. Guidelines are scarce.
Just as Wiley left the arbitrator free to consider all the circumstances sur-
rounding the entire transaction and to formulate a solution which would be
neither unreasonably harsh for the parties concerned nor violative of the
Interscience contract, other courts have declined to be definitive in remand-
ing for arbitration. The Third Circuit in Reliance, for example, merely
pointed to Wiley's carefully guarded language as recognizing that circum-
stances changed by an acquisition or merger could make unreasonable or
inequitable a command of literal adherence to particular terms of a pred-
ecessor's agreement. Thus, it left the arbitrator free to study the facts and to
determine the equities. 91
In view of the need for flexibility in arbitration, however, and of the requi-
site time-consuming, close scrutiny of the facts by an arbitrator, a lack of ju-
88. Labor-Management Relations Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
89. See Fanning, supra note 53, at 286.
90. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964).
91. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (1964).
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dicially-imposed criteria is not surprising; 92 the arbitrator must have a good
deal of freedom in effecting conciliation.98 Considering all the circumstances
of the particular transaction before him and its resulting effect on the parties,
as well as reviewing the historical relationship between the union and the
predecessor, the arbitrator may interpret the terms of the agreement and
balance the interests of the parties involved in applying them.
Precisely because the scope and effect of each arbitral decision are so
specifically confined to its facts and determined by the equities of the partic-
ular situation few general guidelines have developed even among arbitrators
themselves. In each situation the arbitrator must apply his discretion in de-
termining, for example, that the continuity of operations is sufficiently ex-
tensive to bind the successor to all the terms of the prior contract or, on the
contrary, that the business changes are so ex.tensive that no employee rights
survive.
Arbitrators are not, of course, entirely unbridled in their power for, as the
Supreme Court has stated:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance
from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.94
Thus, they may not rewrite the contract for the parties, disregard limitations
on their jurisdiction or authority contained in the agreement, or make awards
contrary to federal and state statutes or public policy. 95 However, the
courts' expansion of the scope of arbitrators' authority and disinclination to
overturn their decisions indicates the increasing difficulty in avoiding the re-
sults of such determinations.96
92. "[C]ourts generally lack sufficient expertise to engage in the necessarily detailed
study of the new employment setting and the particular terms of the predecessor
contract to determine which are suitable for the new setting." Successor Employers,
supra note 51, at 426.
93. Courts may in the future provide precedent for determining the merits of
particular situations in cases where an agreement has no grievance provision or where
no resort is had to arbitration and where, consequently, remanding to an arbitrator is
not possible. See Patrick, supra note 60, at 440.
94. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
95. See Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The
Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1965).
96. See Patrick, supra note 60, at 417-18. The great independence of arbitrators
was described and emphasized by the Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel & Car when
it declined to reverse an ambiguous arbitration order: "The refusal of courts to
review ...an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration
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Without specific rules to guide arbitrators, decisions in this area, as in ar-
bitrations in ordinary, noncombination situations, must continue to be based
virtually entirely on the arbitrator's view of the merits and of the best means
for achieving industrial peace.
Conflicting Union Representatives
One of the most interesting problems not covered by Wiley concerns the sur-
vival of unionized employees' rights under a predecessor's collective agree-
ment when their integration following a business combination brings them
into conflict with a successor's employees' extant union. There were no
confrontations between separate unions in Wiley, Wackenhut, or Reliance,
and the problem did not concern the courts until McGuire v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co. arose in 1966. 97 In that case Weber & Quinn, a small coal and
fuel oil company with 24 employees, all represented by Teamsters Local 553,
was purchased by Humble Oil whose 335 employees were represented by
Industrial Employees Association, Inc. Thirteen Weber & Quinn employees
voluntarily joined Humble and were integrated into the company's opera-
tions, while the other 11 either declined employment or failed Humble's
physical examination. Local 553 subsequently demanded that Humble ar-
bitrate various grievances under the Weber & Quinn collective agreement and,
on refusal, instituted suit.
During the pendency of the action, Humble filed a petition with the NLRB
under Section 9(b) of the Act 98 for clarification of the appropriate bargain-
ing unit. The Board ruled that the 13 employees, having been effectively
integrated into the Humble operations and unit, could no longer be consid-
ered a separate bargaining entity and that, consequently, the Association
was the exclusive bargaining representative of all 348 employees. 99 Follow-
ing this ruling the case reached the courts.
In view of the presence of a second union representing the buyer's em-
ployees and of the NLRB ruling and certification, the Second Circuit believed
the situation to be entirely different from that in Wiley and reversed the dis-
trict court's order of arbitration.100 The court did not believe that the. indus-
trial peace on which Wiley was predicated would be advanced by compelling
arbitration under such circumstances:
would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards." 363
U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
But, it has been suggested that there is a growing movement toward greater judicial
review of arbitral awards. Patrick, supra note 60, at 441-42.
97. 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966).
98. Labor-Management Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
99. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1361 (1965).
100. McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
rev'd, 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966).
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If the judgment below should be affirmed and the arbitration pro-
ceedings commence, there would be an obvious conflict between
the interests of the Humble employees as a whole and the interests
of the 13 Humble employees who formerly worked for Weber &
Quinn. If it be assumed that in the arbitration proceeding Local
553 would continue to represent the former employees of Weber
& Quinn, it is not unlikely that they would press for an award giving
these employees preferential treatment in the matter of seniority,
job security, working conditions and other benefits that would ad-
versely affect the other Humble employees. The result might well
be unrest and dissatisfaction among the vast majority of workers
in the plant. Such a burdening of the collective bargaining rela-
tionship is clearly to be avoided, as a matter of national labor
policy.
1°1
Furthermore, the court saw a danger of its compelling Humble to commit an
unfair labor practice. Since an employer under Section 9(a) of the Labor
Act 10 2 may bargain with the representative only of a majority of the em-
ployees in a unit, "an order to Humble to arbitrate might force Humble to
commit an unfair labor practice by 'bargaining' with a minority union when
a majority union is in existence.'1 0 3  It found, therefore, no duty on the part
of Humble to submit to arbitration of the Local's grievances, and the Supreme
Court declined to review the decision.
Although several commentators have indicated their support of this de-
cision, 10 4 it does seem to be subject to certain legitimate criticism. While
the potential clash of union interests might appear to justify the court's fear
of industrial strife, the decision seems to overlook the Wiley Court's reliance
on the flexibility of arbitration as the most effective means of insuring peace
where the interests of separate groups (a union group v. an unrepresented
group in Wiley) might conflict.' 0 5
It is possible that the court, because of its fear of compelling an unfair
labor practice, failed to appreciate the significance of the Board's action on
Humble's Section 9(b) petition. The NLRB's clarification ruling specifically
101. Id., 355 F.2d at 357.
102. Labor-Management Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1964).
103. McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 1966).
104. See, e.g., Shaw & Carter, Sales, Mergers and Union Contract Relations, 19
N.Y.U. CONF. LABOR 357, 372 (1967); Fanning, The Purchaser and the Labor Contract
-An Escalating Theory, 1967 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 284, 288.
105. See discussion accompanying notes 25-31, supra. But see Note, Obligations of
Successor Employers: Recent Variations on the John Wiley Theme, 2 GA. L. REV.
574, 586-87 (1968). This article also suggests an approach for peacefully resolving
situations involving conflicting union representatives. That is, the successor could
arbitrate the demands of the predecessor union under the contract existing between the
successor and its own union, assuming that the successor's contract was comprehensive
enough to serve as a basis of arbitration for the issues raised by the predecessor union.
Id. at 588.
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declined to assert any view on the question of Humble's contractual obliga-
tions to the Local, deciding only the representation question.' 06 It did not
preclude Humble from arbitrating with the Local'07 and consequently, would
probably have declined to find an unfair labor practice had arbitration en-
sued. Furthermore, arbitration with a minority union, at least to the extent
it constitutes discharge of pre-merger obligations, is not necessarily incon-
sistent with recognition of a majority union. But even if it were so considered
in this situation, it has not been established that the rationale of the rule
against bargaining with a minority union is applicable to a business combina-
tion:
In the past, unfair labor practices have been found when the em-
ployer bargains with a union seeking to act as the exclusive repre-
sentative following its decertification and the certification of another
or attempting to adjust grievances under a contract negotiated by
another union which is still the certified representative. 108
Not only were such factors absent in the McGuire situation, but the need for
employee protection from a sudden change in the employment relationship,
to which Wiley adverted, would seem to militate against an unfair labor
practice finding. Besides, had arbitration commenced and had the Associa-
tion filed a charge with the Board, a stay could have been ordered pending
the resolution of the unfair practice question by the Board, the tribunal which,
as the Second Circuit seemed to believe, has primary responsibility under
Section 10(a) of the Act'09 for the determination of unfair labor practices.
Teamsters v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc.," 0 a two-union case not involv-
ing a change of ownership, gives support to the McGuire rationale."' Red
Ball merged two of its trucking terminals, closing one and stationing all the
employees in the other. Since separate unions represented the two groups of
workers, Red Ball sought to preempt any labor difficulty by agreeing with
both organizations to request that the Board conduct an election to deter-
mine the exclusive bargaining representative of the combined group. Ob-
jections by the Teamsters, the union at the closed terminal, caused two elec-
tions to be set aside and before a third could be held that union sought to
106. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1361, 1362-63 (1965).
107. Id.
108. 66 COLuM. L. REV. 967, 972-73 (1966).
109. Labor-Management Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
110. 374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967).
111. Two other cases are also pertinent. The Second Circuit impliedly reaffirmed its
McGuire rationale in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, 393
F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 276 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Furthermore, Chief
Justice Burger, while sitting on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
foreshadowed McGuire's reference to and reliance on Wiley's footnote in National
Ass'n of Broadcast Technicians v. FCC, 346 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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arbitrate various grievances under its old agreement. When Red Ball re-
fused to comply with the arbitrator's award, a suit commenced.
The problem for the Fifth Circuit was to determine whether the Teamsters'
contract continued to exist as a binding document and, therefore, whether
its arbitration provisions were enforceable. It found that the merger removed
each union from its status as a- unit's exclusive bargaining representative,
and, since an employer statutorily could not bargain with any but his em-
ployees' exclusive representative, Red Ball could not be compelled to violate
its Section 8(a)(2) duty of neutrality" 12 by dealing with the Teamsters alone.
More importantly, after distinguishing the Wiley situation by noting the pres-
ence of two unions and the McGuire case by noting the lack of a designated
employee representative, the court further analyzed the particular circum-
stances before it in terms of the industrial peace to which Wiley had addressed
itself. It believed that if the arbitral disposition of one union's grievance were
extremely favorable to it, it would give rise to a complaint by the opposing
union, thus initiating a series of alternating complaints and requests for ar-
bitration by the respective unions and ensuring conflict between the two
labor groups.
Although this decision may be open to the same criticisms to which Mc-
Guire has been subjected, particularly its lack of faith in the arbitral proc-
ess," 8 it has, in conjunction with McGuire, raised the question of the appli-
cability of the Wiley rationale to the two-union situation. Perhaps the Su-
preme Court agreed with these two decisions by implying in Wiley that
the confrontation of two unions might give rise to a conflict too difficult
for even arbitration to resolve."14 Perhaps the courts will compel arbitration
in two-union situations which do not involve the unusual circumstances of
McGuire and Red Ball.
The McGuire and Red Ball decisions are well-reasoned and the Supreme
Court may be required to make the final resolution of this issue. In view
of the arguments posed above and of the Supreme Court's express recognition
of the merits of arbitration, however, it is predicted that the Court will compel
arbitration where conflicting unions with at least comparatively equal-sized
memberships 15 are merged. Further case law is required before a sub-
stantially clear principle may be distilled from this particular area.
112. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1964).
113. It has been argued that the courts in these two cases failed "to take account of
the many employee grievances that do not involve the relationship of the employer
to the other employees." Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Em-
ployer, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 735, 766 (1969).
114. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 n.5 (1964).
115. The Supreme Court declined to review the McGuire case with its two dis-
parately-sized unions. It was never presented with the Red Ball situation in which,
apparently, comparatively-sized memberships were involved.
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Conclusion
In addition to the major problems left undetermined by the Wiley Court,
lower courts have addressed themselves to other, less significant issues. For
example, a successor may be held responsible for remedying his predeces-
sor's unfair labor practices; 116 the expiration of a predecessor's contract be-
fore the consummation of a sale or merger may not eliminate his successor's
duty to arbitrate;" 7 and, a disclaimer by a successor of the assumption of his
seller's agreement will not abrogate his duty of arbitration. 1 8 Other issues
may yet arise. It has not yet been determined what criteria will apply when
a subsequent employer seeks to bind a union to his predecessor's agreement.
The Board's decision in Kota will probably resolve this issue by holding that
a union, as well as a successor employer, is bound to its predecessor's con-
tract. Nor has it been decided whether the rationale of Textile Workers v.
Darlington Mfg. Co." 9 will apply to a merger or other combination which
is not effected for "genuine business reasons" as Wiley impliedly com-
manded. 120 It does not seem unreasonable to predict that it will be so ap-
plied.
Even after these questions are answered, others will inevitably arise in this
challenging and complex area. We may look forward to interesting deci-
sions which will further delineate the respective rights of labor and manage-
ment subsequent to the effecting of business combinations.
116. Perma Vinyl Corp., Dade Plastics Co., and U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 164
N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1967), aII'd, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968). See Gordon, Legal
Questions of Successorship, 3 GA. L. REV. 280, 292-308 (1969), and Goldberg, supra
note 113, at 813-33 for comprehensive discussions of this area.
117. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 838 (1967).
118. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir.
1964); Brotherhood of Pulp Mill Workers v. Great Northwest Fibre Co., 263 F.
Supp. 167 (E.D. Wash. 1965).
119. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
120. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 545 (1964).
